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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE Ju

ic~iC

EXPRESsION OF THE SACRED TRUST OF CIVILZATION

I
On July 18, 1966, the International Court of Justice delivered its judg-

ment in the second phase of the South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v.
South Africa and Liberia v. South Africa).1 The votes of the judges were

equally divided, but by the President's casting vote the Court decided to
reject the claims of the Empire of Ethiopia and the Republic of Liberia.
It came to the conclusion that the Applicants could not be considered to
have established any legal right or interest appertaining to them in the
subject matter of the claims against the mandatory Power (South Africa)
and that, accordingly, it had to decline to give effect to them. It is not
intended in this brief inquiry to recall all the legal problems and arguments
raised in the proceedings or to discuss the details of the judgment. Attention may, however, be drawn to one particular aspect of the cases, i.e., the
possibility of deriving from the principle of the sacred trust of civilization
a legal right or interest in the conduct of the Mandate, with special reference to the Mandate for South West Africa. The Court drew a distinction
between the "conduct" and the "special interest" provisions of the various
instruments of the Mandate, and it asked the question whether a Mandatory (South Africa) had any direct obligation towards the other Members
of the League of Nations individually (e.g., Ethiopia and Liberia) as regards the carrying out of the "conduct" provisions of the Mandate for South
West Africa. The judgment states as follows:
...

[T]he Court must examine what is perhaps the most important

contention of a general character that has been advanced.., namely
the contention by which it is sought to derive a legal right or interest
in the conduct of the mandate from the simple existence, or principle, of the "sacred trust"....2

The Court then proceeded to examine the meaning of this principle:
The sacred trust, it is said, is a "sacred trust of civilization". Hence all
civilized nations have an interest in seeing that it is carried out. An
interest, no doubt;-but in order that this interest may take on a
specifically legal character, the sacred trust itself must be or become
something more than a moral or humanitarian ideal ....

The Court had stated earlier that:
Humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational basis
for rules of law, just as, for instance, the preambular parts of the United
Nations Charter constitute the moral and political basis for the specific
legal provisions thereafter set out. Such considerations do not, howI South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 6; 61 A.J.I.L. 116
(1967).
2 Soutk West Africa Cases, oc. cit. note 1 above, at 34.
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ever, inthemselves amount to rules of law. All States are interestedhave an interest-in such matters. But the existence of an "interest"
does not of itself entail that this interest is specifically juridical in
character.
Thus (the Court proceeded) the sacred trust of civilization, in order to
generate legal rights and obligations, must be given "juridical expression
and be clothed in legal form." It is in this connection that the Court made
its most important pronouncement, for it said that "In the present case the
principle of the sacred trust has as its sole furidical expression8 the mandates system." Thus the locus standi of the Applicants in the case must
depend on the legal analysis of the various instruments of the Mandate.
The Court also made it clear that "the principle of the sacred trust has no
residual juridical content which could, so far as any particular mandate is
concerned operate per se to give rise to legal rights and obligations outside the system as a whole" and justify the existence of a justiciable legal
interest in the violation of the Mandate by the Mandatory Power (South
Africa).
In a case in which the votes of the judges are equally divided, the precarious balance of adjudication makes the opinions of the dissenting judges
deserving of particular attention. Judge Forster, in his dissenting opinion,
had this to say:
...[T]his same Court, which gave the three... Advisory Opinions
in1950, 4 1955 and 1956 and which in 1962 delivered a judgment upholding its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute,
this Court now declares the claim to be inadmissible and rejects it on
the ground that Ethiopia and Liberia have no legal interest in the
action.
This passes my understanding. 5
A number of dissenting judges, including Judge Jessup (p. 324), Judge
Koretsky (p. 245), and Judge Padilla Nervo (p. 453), made particular
reference to the principle of the sacred trust of civilization. Judge Tanaka
(p. 265) referred to the historical aspects of the principle and stated:
The idea that it belongs to the noble obligation of conquering powers
to treat indigenous peoples of conquered territories and to promote
their well-being has existed for many hundred years, at least since
the era of Vitoria ....
Without tracing the antecedents of the mandate (and trusteeship) system to the period of the classic writers, which in itself would be a tempting
proposition," we may recall some of the fundamental details of the European-African confrontation in the nineteenth century, particularly the
S Emphasis supplied.

4Lord McNair in his separate opinion in the South West Africa Case of 1950 described mandates as valid in rem and thus permanent and capable of surviving the
disappearance of the League of Nations.
[1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128, at 156-157.

International Status of South West Africa,

5ibid. at 478.

6See, for instance, H. R. Wagner, The Life and Writings of Bartolom6 de ]as Casas
(1967); Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations 2-23 (1930).
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hundreds of bilateraltreaties, by which European Powers assumed the protection of African countries or acquired their territory, and the general
multilateral arrangement made by the Powers at the Berlin Conference of
1884-1885. As the American approach to African problems at this Conference differed to some extent from that of the European Powers, it
would be particularly interesting to examine some of the details of United
States participation in the Berlin proceedings. Such an examination may
perhaps allow us to detect the existence of the principle of the sacred trust
of civilization in 19th-century international law, and to discuss critically
the restrictive view expressed by the International Court of Justice to the
effect that the mandate system is the sole juridical expression of the principle.
II
At the time of convening the Berlin Conference, the European-African
confrontation had gradually gathered momentum, and a number of European Powers had already entered the African scene and established treaty
relations with African Rulers and Chiefs. It has to be remembered that
the African Continent then presented and now presents to the international
lawyer a highly heterogeneous picture. The political organization of
African states on the Mediterranean coast had to its credit a more ancient
tradition than the remainder of African countries. Again, while the countries on the East African coast followed to some extent the pattern of
Islamic states surrounding the Indian Ocean (particularly Zanzibar), the
states and Chieftainships of West, Central and South Africa followed different patterns. But, however heterogeneous the political map of Africa
might have been, African territory could not, any more than Asian territory, be treated as terra nullius by the European newcomer. Hence the
need for negotiations with Rulers and Chiefs, which either led to the conclusion of treaties of protection or treaties of cession, or treaties of friendship and commerce. The purpose of the Berlin Conference was to sort
out the ensuing conflicts and problems, particularly in the Congo Basin,
and to establish a measure of uniformity in the policies of European Powers
aiming at inter-European co-operation in Africa. It must also be emphasized that, though African Rulers were not represented at the Berlin Conference,7 their role in the over-all African settlement was not entirely passive, for all European Powers pursued a consistent policy of reliance on
treaties with Rulers and not on unilateral action by unilateral occupation
of territory. The proceedings of the Berlin Conference showed clearly
that the above treaties were considered as real treaties in the meaning of
international law. Particularly as to treaties concluded between Germany
and South West African Rulers, there is evidence in German legal literature that the treaties were classified as instruments of international law
7Zanzibar acceded later to the Berlin Act of 1885. Turkey, being the suzerain of a
number of African dependencies, participated throughout in the Conference. See 29
H. R. Exec. Does. (1884-1885), No. 247 (48th Cong., 2nd Sess.), p. 179 (hereinafter

cited as H. R. Exec. Doc.).
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transferring sovereignty over South West African territory from the Rulers
to the German Empire.8
A discussion of the various types of African treaties has been attempted
elsewhere 0 and does not call for repetition. Suffice it to say that among
these treaties the treaty of protection was oile of the leading instruments
for introducing the African communities into the orbit of the law of nations.
European Powers undertook in each case to secure to the African communities the benefits of European civilization without impairing their national
and cultural identity. The principle of the sacred trust of civilization was
implied in them; and when, at a later date, the nature of these treaties was
discussed at the Berlin Conference, the existence of such a trust for the
protection of the African communities was expressly acknowledged. It
is with these considerations in mind that some of the relevant proceedings
of the Conference and United States participation in them may be recalled.
III
On October 11, 1884, the German Government, through its Minister in
Washington, made propositions to the United States Government for the
latter's participation in the future Berlin Conference, which had three
main objectives: (1) liberty of trade in the Basin and in the Delta of the
Congo; (2) application to the Congo and the Niger of the principles
adopted by the Congress of Vienna of 1815 relating to freedom of navigation upon international rivers; and (3) definition of the formalities to be
observed in order that any new occupation of territory upon the African
coasts should be deemed to be effective. It is the third point which deserves attention. This principle extended to the African coasts in general
and not merely to the Basin of the Congo. The term occupation, as the
proceedings show, was not used in the meaning of unilateral occupation
but as occupation in consequence of the acquisition from Rulers of titles
to territory.10
Following the German invitation, Mr. John Adam Kasson, United States
Minister in Berlin,11 reported to the Secretary of State, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, that the third German proposition relating to the acquisition
of African territory was "restrictive and conservative of the rights of the
native tribes [Rulers] against foreign encroachments." Mr. Kasson was
subsequently appointed United States Delegate to the Berlin Conference 12
8 See particularly the writings of Dr. Herman Hesse: Schutzvertraige (1905), relating
to South West African treaties of protection; and Rechtsgiiltigkeit der Konzessionen
(1906), relating to the legal validity of concessions.
9Alexandrowicz, "The Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations," 123 Hague
Academy, Recueil des Cours 117-124 (1968, I).
10 H. R. Exec. Doe., op. cit. note 7 above, at 1-179.
11John Adam Kasson (1822-1910) had become, on President Lincoln's election,
Assistant Postmaster General, in which position he was instrumental in convening the
World Postal Congress in Paris in 1863. He was elected to Congress in 1862 but later
entered the diplomatic profession. In 1877 he was appointed U. S. Minister to Vienna,
and in 1884 to Berlin. See 10 Dictionary of American Biography 260-261 (1933).
12 The reason for U. S. participation in the Berlin Conference was, apart from its
interest in freedom of trade in Africa, its intimate connection with the Republic of
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and he was to act with the assistance of two associate Delegates, Col. Henry
S. Sanford, and Henry M. Stanley, the famous African explorer. In his
address to the Conference on November 19, 1884, Mr. Kasson referred to
Mr. Stanley as "ain American citizen, who was qualified by courage, perseverence, and itelligence [sic], and by a remarkable intrepidity and aptitude in exploration." He then added that
[i]t was the earnest desire of the United States that these [African]
discoveries should be utilized for the civilization of the native races
and for the abolition of the slave trade.13
And further: "An International Association of Americans and Europeans
was formed under high and philanthropic European patronage [the King
of the Belgians] to give reality to such a purpose. They obtained concessions and jurisdiction throughout the Basin of the Congo from the native
sovereignties which were the sole authorities existing there and exercising
dominion over the soil or the people .... ." At the meetings of the Conference on December 15, 1884, and January 5, 1885, the question of acquisition of territory from African Rulers or Chiefs was further pursued, and
it was stated that "the older assumption of rights by original discovery,
apart from actual settlements is practically abandoned." "I Neither was
occupation by original title a feasible proposition, as the concept of terra
nullius was not applicable to a politically organized continent.
The establishment of the principle of the sacred trust of civilization is
strictly connected with the transfer by the African communities of their
territory, their sovereignty, and their destiny to the European Powers,
which, through the relevant transactions, assumed the r6le of guardians
of these communities. Senate Report No. 393 (48th Congress, 1st Session ),15 referring to the work of the African International Association,
stated as follows:
... [I]ts agents have made nearly one hundred treaties with the
chiefs of the different tribes in the Congo country. In each of these
treaties there are valuable commercial agreements and regulations
touching law and order, and certain delegations of limited powers,
all of which are intended for the better government of the country.
The powers are not ceded to a new and usurping sovereignty seeking to destroy existing Governments, but are delegated to a common
agent for common welare [trust]. In the language of the first treaty,
concluded at Vivi June 13, 1880, and which is the plan after which
nearly one hundred subsequent treaties have been modelled-:the
aforesaid chiefs of the district of Vivi recognize that it is highly desirable that the comite d'4tudes of the Congo [the predecessor of
Liberia, established thanks to the initiative of American colonization societies which
settled free American Negroes on the West Coast of Africa. This colony of settlers
under U. S. protection achieved independent statehood in 1847. See Mr. Kasson's
reference to Liberia, in Exec. Doe., op. cit. note 7 above, at 14-18. In 1862 the
United States concluded a treaty with Liberia. See 1 Malloy, Treaties, Conventions,
International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States and Other
Powers, 1776-1909, p. 1050 (1910).
1$H. R.Exec. Doc., op. cit. note 7 above, at 7. Emphasis supplied.
14 Ibid. at 10.
15 Ibid. at 167.
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the Association] should create and develop in their states establishments calculated to foster commerce and trade, and to assure to the
country and its inhabitants the advantages [of civilization] which are
the consequence thereof.
"With this object in view they cede and abandon, in full property...
to the comite detudes, the territory comprised within the following
6
limits...
The report further refers to the numerous treaties concluded by Great
Britain :17 and France with African Rulers, and it concludes that "it can
scarcely be denied that the native chiefs have the right to make [these]
treaties." - The massive transfer of territorial sovereignty to the European
Powers created, in the words of the French delegate to the Berlin Conference, "the necessity to manage as much as possible the acquired rights and
the legitimate interests of the indigenous chiefs." "I In this connection Mr.
Kasson asked "if it would be agreed to affirm explicitly the intentions of
the Conference to respect, in a general manner, the rights of the indigenous
Chiefs... limited by these acts."
A review of documents in the principal collections of African treaties
(among which E. Hertslet's collection is the most systematic) would reveal that the transfer of sovereign rights or titles by the African Rulers to
the protecting European Powers was either expressly2 0 or implicitly connected with the duty of civilization, i.e., the task of the transferee to assist
African communities in achieving a higher level of civilization before they
re-entered the family of nations as equal sovereign entities. It may be
recalled that prior to the Berlin Conference a Committee of the British
House of Commons had in 1865 made a statement to the effect that
all further extension of territory or assumption of government, of new
treaties offering any protection to native tribes, would be inexpedient;
and that the object of our policy should be to encourage in the natives the exercise of those qualities which may render it possible for
of all the
us more and more to transfer to them the administration
governments with a view to our ultimate withdrawal .... 21
16 In 1884 the International Association of the Congo issued a declaration relating
to the acquisition of territories from "the legitimate sovereigns in the Basin of the
Congo." The U. S. Secretary of State recognized the flag of the Association in the
same year. 1 Malloy, op. cit. note 12 above, at 327; 3 A.J.IL. Supp. 5 (1909).
17 The British Ambassador at the Berlin Conference, Sir Edward Mallet, declared
at its session on Nov. 15, 1884, that "the welfare of the natives is not to be neglected."
It must be remembered that they "are not represented at this Conference and that,
nevertheless, the decisions of this body will be of the gravest importance to them."
H. R. Exec. Doc., op. cit. note 7 above, at 34.
19 ibid. at 157.
18 ibid. at 169.
See, for
20 1 Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty 49, 103, 345 (3d ed., 1909).
instance, the Treaty of 1877 between Great Britain and King Samoo Bullom for the
promotion of "commerce and civilization" and the Treaty of 1885 between Great Britain
and the King of Malin which was "to promote to his subjects the advantages of civilization." The Charter of the Imperial British East Africa Company of 1888 stated trade
and good government and the advancement of civilization to be among the objectives
of the Company. The General Act of the Conference of Berlin relates to trade and
21 3 Hertslet, cited above, at 780.
civilization. 2 Hertslet at 468.
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A report submitted by a commission of the Berlin Conference, charged
to examine the project of the Declaration concerning liberty of commerce
in the Basin of the Congo and its affluents refers in Article VI 22 to the
indigenous populations
who, in the present state of affairs, are scarcely qualified to defend their
own interests" and states that "the Conference has thought proper to
assume the role of official guardian... [T]he duty to aid them to attain higher political and social status, the obligation to instruct and
initiate them into the advantages of civilization are unanimously recognized ....
No dissent manifested
itself, nor could manifest itself, in
23
this respect in the Commission.

This multilateral statement on guardianship, made within the framework
of the transactions of the Conference, must be considered as declaratory
of the consensus of opinion of all civilized states. The Commission added
these weighty words at the end of the statement: 'It is the future of Africa
which is here at issue."
The question may be asked whether it is possible, in view of the hundreds
of bilateral treaties by which the African communities sought the protection of European Powers and in view of the multilateralstatement of Powers
united in a world conference, to assume that the principle of the sacred
trust of civilization which found its expression in these nineteenth-century
legal instruments nevertheless existed in a legal vacuum. Should the answer to this question be in the negative, it would not be possible to persist
in the conviction that the mandates system is the sole juridical expression
of the above principle. Its pre-mandatory legal reality is worthy of the
attention of international lawyers.
IV
The General Act of the Berlin Conference contained two important
principles in Articles 34 and 35. Article 34 laid down the principle of
notification to the contracting Powers of any future taking of possession of
any territory on the coasts of Africa. Article 35 embodied the principle of
effective occupation of territory. While the principle of notification was
extended to protectorates, the principle of effective occupation was not to
be applied to them.2 4 The protectorate as such was not defined in the
two articles, and thus prima facie it must be assumed that reference had
been made to the classic protectorate, which excludes the occupation of dependent territory and which implies no more than the transfer of the exercise of external sovereignty from the protected entity to the protector.2 5 But
in practice the African protectorate started degenerating into an instrument
of annexation of territory, irrespective of the legitimate rights of the contracting Rulers or Chiefs.2 It was for this reason, inter alia, that the United
2"H. R. Exec. Doe., op. cit. note 7 above, at 83.
.-3 Emphasis supplied.

- 2 Hertslet, op. cit. note 20, at 484-485; see also 3 A.J.I.L. Supp. 24 (1909).
25As to the views of certain writers to the contrary, see Hague Academy, Recueil
des Cours, op. cit. note 9 above, at 194.
26Ibid. at 193.
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States did not ultimately ratify the final Act of the Berlin Conference. In
this connection Mr. Kasson committed two observations to the protocol
of the Final Act:
1. Modern international law steadily follows the road which leads
to the recognition of the right of native races to dispose freely of
themselves and of their hereditary soil. Conformably to this principle,
my Government would willingly support a more extended rle-one
which should apply to the said occupations in Africa-a principle looking at the voluntary consent of the natives, of whose country possession
is taken in all cases where they may not have provoked the act of
aggression.
2. I do not doubt the Conference is agreed upon the significance of
the preamble. It only indicates the minimum of essential conditions
to be fulfilled to justify a demand for the recognition of an occupation.
It is always possible that an occupation may be made "effective" by
acts of violence, which are outside of the principles of justice, of national and even of international right. Consequently, it ought to be
well understood that it is reserved to the signatory powers respectively
to appreciate all other conditions-of right as well as of fact-which
must be complied with before an occupation can be recognized as
validY.2
It is suggested that, among the other conditions, the capacity and readiness of the European Powers to fullfill their r6le as international trustees
of civilization for the protection of African communities were essential.
The proceedings of the Berlin Conference bear ample witness to a general
awareness of the connection between transfer of sovereignty, whether
through treaties of protection, treaties of cession or through conquest, 28 and
the establishment of a trust of civilization in favor of the communities
which became the concern of the Powers, assuming the r6le of collective
guardianship, with the ultimate aim of reversion to sovereignty-a political
and legal state of affairs which has been almost universally realized in the
last ten or twenty years.
Among the non-European Powers which ratified the Berlin Act was the
Ottoman Empire, which reserved at the Conference its rights in its African
dependencies. The Sultan of Zanzibar acceded to the Berlin Act in 1886.
The General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1890 counted among its
non-European signatories Persia, Turkey and Zanzibar. Ethiopia and Liberia acceded to the Act in 1890 and 1892 respectively.2 Though the
Brussels Act was primarily concerned with the slave trade, it was in essence
a continuation of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference which had been
declaratory of the principle of the sacred trust of civilization.8" Ethiopia
and Liberia appear here as contracting parties and active participants in its
development as a legal principle at the pre-mandatory stage-a circumstance which would justify or at least support their locus standi in the
R. Exec. Doc., op. cit. note 7 above, at 177. Emphasis supplied.
E.g., Southern Rhodesia under King Lobengula, or Madagascar. Hague Academy,
Recueil des Cours, op. cit. note 9 above, at 195.
292 Hertslet, op. cit. note 20 above, at 488. See also 3 A.J.I.L. Supp. 29 (1909).
so M. F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territories in International Law 333 (1926).
27H.
28
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South West Africa Cases. The abrogation of the Berlin and Brussels Acts
between the Powers which ratified the Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye
of 1919 did not mean any change in the legal rights and duties of these
Powers. Their commitments towards the African communities as trustees
of civilization were in substance re-enacted by Article 11 of the Convention of 1919. In fact the latter extended the provisions of Article VI of
the Berlin Act, which had been conceived in a spirit of international
guardianship, to all the African territories belonging to the Powers concerned. Article 11 stated that "the Signatory Powers exercising sovereign
rights or authority in African territories w.ill continue to watch over the
preservation of the native populations and to supervise the improvement
of the conditions of their moral and material well-being" with the ultimate
aim of self-government. 31
The formulation of the mandate system within the framework of the
League of Nations reflects the efforts of President Wilson to give full and
unexceptional expression to the principle of trust. Paradoxically enough,
General Smuts, who had inspired the adoption of the idea of a sacred
trust of civilization within the mandate system, fought at the Peace Conference in 1919 for the annexation of South West Africa by the Union of
South Africa. 3- President Wilson's reaction was that "he could not return
to America with the world parcelled out by the great powers." He said
that "'the fundamental idea would be that the world was acting as trustee
through a mandatory." 31
The League of Nations mandatory system applied only to certain African,
Pacific, and Asian territories which were taken over from Germany and the
Ottoman Empire after World War I. But the principle of trust of civilization was not confined to these territories within the mandate system. It
" Lindley, ibid. at 334.
British Labor Party supported President Wilson's policy. See W. R. Louis,
"The South-West African Origins of the Sacred Trust 1914-19," 66 African Affairs
20-39 (1967).
See Louis, cited above, at 35, and South West Africa Cases, 4 I.CJ. Pleadings,
Oral Arguments, Documents 235 (1966). The Applicants in the South West Africa
case introduced "the organized international community" theory in the proceedings.
This meant that the enforcement of the sacred trust became the responsibility of the
organized international community, a concept distinct from that of the League of
Nations. 5 I.C.J. Pleadings, etc. 36-37 (1966). While it is true to say that the
international community, i.e., the family of nations, is different from the League of
Nations, it is not the former but the Conferences of Berlin (1885) and of Brussels
(1890) which, prior to the mandate system, gave legal expression to the sacred trust
of civilization. Through the Acts of these Conferences the contracting parties assumed
the r6le of guardians of African communities from which they had acquired territory
on the basis of bilateral treaties. Ethiopia and Liberia became contracting parties to
the Brussels Act and thus acquired a legal interest in the conduct of the guardianship,
of -which the mandate system was a further legal expression. Ethiopia and Liberia
did not refer in their pleadings to the official guardianship proclaimed at the Berlin
Conference or to the consequences of their accession to the Brussels Act. But this
did not justify the categorical statement of the Court that the mandate system is the
sole juridical expression of the sacred trust of civilization and that the latter has no
"residual juridical content."
'-The
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applied also to other colonial territories which, prior to World War I or
later, had come under the sway of the Powers.
Under Article 23(b) of the League of Nations Covenant, the Members
of the League ". . . (b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native
inhabitants of territories under their control; . . ." Thus the British Gov-

ernment declared expressly in 1923 that in the administration of Kenya
the interests of the African population must be paramount, as the latter
are the beneficiaries of the sacred trust of civilization exercised on their
behalf.3 4 The same argument applies to all territories in Africa, the Pacific,
or Asia in which a trust relationship had been established long before the
days of the League of Nations. As witnessed at the Berlin Conference of
1885, this trust relationship must be deemed to be of a juridical character
with all corresponding rights and duties attaching to the participating
Powers. Moreover, Liberia and Ethiopia had, prior to the mandate system, joined as contracting parties to the Brussels Act of 1890 which, even
cannot be dismissed as a vital link in
if not directly relevant to the case,
35
the chain of legal development.
The Institute of International Law at its Cambridge meeting in 1931
made the remarkable statement that "[t]he communities under mandate
are subjects of international law. They have a patrimony distinct from
that of the mandatory State; they possess a national status, and they may
acquire rights or be held to their obligations." 3 The collapse of the sovereignty of the colonial Powers over these communities marked the end
of the era of trust relationships, which had existed legally since the nineteenth century, and the independence of most of the African countries. As
such, they were able in a reorganized form to re-enter the family of nations
and regain the territories ceded to the Powers in the past.
The General Assembly has now terminated the Mandate for South West
Africa. Though such termination is not a right provided for in Article 22
of the Covenant of the League of Nations or the relevant Mandate Agreement, it may be considered as implied in the sacred trust of civilization.3
34 Lindley, op. cit. note 30 above, at 335.
35 S. F. Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States 576 (4th ed., 1955), states
that the principle of trust, as envisaged by the Berlin Conference of 1885, carries the
"germ of the idea of international mandate." Art. 6 of the Berlin Act states that
"All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories
bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for
the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being .... ." The
Brussels Act of 1890 refers to "assuring to that vast continent the benefits of peace
and civilisation ..... " The author of a League of Nations publication on the mandate
system, which was referred to in the proceedings before the I.C.J., states that while
the Brussels Act created legal obligations as to the slave trade and other matters, there
are no legal obligations in the Berlin Act, a view not reconcilable with the term "bind"
in the Berlin Act. See 4 I.C.. Pleadings, etc., op. cit. note 33, at 233, citing League
of Nations, The Mandates System; Origins-Principles-Application 9, 10 (League of
Nations Pub. 1945, VI.A. 1.).
36 See 26 AJ.I.L. 91, note 6 (1932), and J. C. Starke, Introduction to International
Law 164 (1967).
3 John Dugard, "The Revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa," 62 A.J.I.L.
78-97 (1968).
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Whatever the legal character of this important step taken by the United
Nations, it creates a situation which is awkward from the political as well
w, legal point of view. When the General Assembly at its 21st Session
in 1966 considered the draft resolution introduced by 54 African and Asian
states condemning the administration of the mandated territory of South
West Africa by the Republic of South Africa and proposing its termination
and take-over by the United Nations, most Members expressed disappointment in the ruling of the International Court of Justice of 1966."*
The purpose of the above observations has not been to deal with this
disappointment from the political point of view. It has rather been to
point to the fact that the majority judges failed to explore the historical
background of the sacred trust of civilization, which might have tipped
the precarious balance of the votes in a different direction. Even if it is
admitted that the jurisdiction of the Court was confined to the consideration of the case from the point of view of the mandate system only, the
statement of the Court relating to "the sole juridical expression of the
sacred trust of civilization" is highly doubtful if not untenable in international law.7'
CHARLEs H. ALEXANDEOWiCZ *

TAx

TiAT-ES BETWEw THE UNITED STATES AND DEVELOPING
NEED FOR A NEw U. S. INrrT

CouNTRmiEs: Tim

The effort of the United States to conclude a series of bilateral tax treaties
with developing countries bas reached a virtual stalemate. Of the twentytwo conventions for the avoidance of double taxation of income currently
in force between the United States and other nations, only two treaties, with
Pakistan and Trinidad and Tobago, exist with members of the so-called
-Third World." The remaining conventions are with economically more
advanced countries, primarily European.'
See, e.g., the remarks of the representatives of Ghana, Iraq, Ceylon, and the
United Arab Republic, Gencral Assembly, 21st Sess., 1419th Meeting, U.N. Doe. A/PV.
1419 (1966).
See also General Assembly Resolutions 2498 (XXIV),' Oct. 31, 1969, 2517 and 2518
(XXIV), Dee. 1, 1969, General Assembly, 24th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 30,
at 65 and 68, U.N. Doe. A/7630 (1970), in which the General Assembly, relying on
earlier Security Council resolutions, condemned the Government of South Africa for
its refusal to withdraw its administration from Namibia (South West Africa).
-1 See R. Higgins, "'The International Court and South West Africa: The Implications of the Judgment," 42 International Affairs 573 (1966).
*Visiting Professorial Fellow, Rcole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Sorbonne.
I nacome tax treaties have been concluded between the United States and Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Lucxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom. In addition, the following newly independent nations have assumed the terms of tax treaties already e.,dsting between their former colonial rulers and the United States: Barbados, Burundi,
Congo (Kinsbasa), Gambia, Jamaica, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia. United States Department of State, Treaties in Force (1970). The United States
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The dearth of agreements in this field between the United States and
the developing countries stands in contrast to the success of other industrialized nations in concluding tax treaties with less developed nations.
Sweden, for example, has entered into income tax treaties with thirteen
developing nations in various parts of the world.2 Japan has concluded
eight such agreements with developing nations, primarily Asian.3
The United States has attempted to extend its network of tax treaties to
developing countries, but its efforts have been repeatedly frustrated by the
attitude of the Senate. In negotiating agreements with such countries the
U. S. Treasury Department has recognized that special provisions not found
in treaties with developed countries are appropriate to tax treaties with
developing nations. This recognition has led to the inclusion within several treaties negotiated by the Treasury of provisions for tax-sparing credits.
Such credits would permit a United States investor to subtract from his
tax owed to the United States Government with respect to income earned
abroad not only taxes paid to the country in which such income was earned,
but also taxes which such foreign country gave up through tax concessions.
Provisions for tax-sparing credits were included in agreements signed with
Pakistan, India, Israel and? the United Arab Republic. The Pakistan treaty
was ratified and took effect, but without the tax-sparing credit which the
United States Senate refused to approve. The other three treaties failed
to receive Senate approval and were withdran by the President in 1964.4
Subsequent to the withdrawal of these treaties the United States Government concluded agreements with Brazil and Thailand, and a second agreement with Israel, providing for extension of the domestic investment credit
to investments by U. S. taxpayers in these developing countries. The
Brazil treaty was approved by the United States Senate, but consent to
the investment credit provision of the treaty was withheld. Neither the
convention signed with Brazil nor the two agreements signed in 1965 with
Thailand and Israel have yet entered into effect.
In the midst of this impasse, the United Nations has taken the initiative
in organizing meetings of experts to analyze the special issues presented by
tax treaties between developed and developing countries. The first such
conference was held in Geneva in December, 1968, and the report of the
concluded a tax treaty with Honduras in 1957. The treaty was terminated by Honduras
as of December 31, 1966. Instruments of ratification of the treaty with Trinidad and
Tobago were exchanged at Port of Spain on Dec. 30, 1970. It is very doubtful
that this agreement will serve as a model for future U. S. treaties with developing
countries. The agreement omits any measure designed to promote investments of U. S.
capital, such as a tax-sparing credit or investment credit. The Trinidad and Tobago
Government argued strongly for such a provision, but agreed to forgo its demands for
the time being, pending further negotiations after ratification of the basic treaty.
2 Sweden has treaties with Argentina, Brazil, Ceylon, India, Israel, Liberia, Morocco,
Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. Martin
Norr, Claes Sandels and Nils G. Hornhammar, The Tax System in Sweden 54 (1969).
3 Japan has treaties with Pakistan, India, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Brazil, Ceylon
and the United Arab Republic. Tax Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Finance, An Outline of Japanese Taxes 203-204 (1969).
4 110 Cong. Rec. 16091 (1964).
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conference proceedings was published late in 1969. 5 The ad hoc group of
experts was created by the Secretary General of the United Nations under
a resolution adopted on August 4, 1967, by the U.N. Economic and Social
Council. The group was composed of twenty-three members from eight
developed and ten developing nations. Although the members attended
in their personal capacities, they were nominated by their respective governments and many were high-level officials. Most of the leading industrial nations named members to the ad hoc group. The United States sent
Stanley S. Surrey, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy,
and Nathan Gordon, the Treasury's Director for International Tax Affairs.
The resolution of the Economic and Social Council directing the creation
of such a panel of experts gave the group
the task of exploring, in consultation with interested international agencies, ways and means for facilitating the conclusion of tax treaties
between developed and, developing countries, including the formulation, as appropriate, of possible guidelines and techniques for use in
such tax treaties ....
6
To the extent that the group's purpose was to reach agreement on model
provisions for inclusion in tax treaties between developed and developing
nations, the panel was not notably successful. The experts were able to
agree on a few provisions appropriate for such treaties. In general, hovever, the report reflects a failure to achieve consensus on most of the important issues raised during the discussions. The disagreements recorded
in the report are not only between members from developed and developing countries. There are also frequent differences of opinion among members from the developed nations and among members from developing
countries.
Of the topics dealt with by the group, probably the most relevant to the
formulation of current United States policy is the question of incentives
for investment in developing countries. The experts from developing countries pointed out that concessions made by such countries to attract investments through tax holidays and similar measures are frustrated unless the
capital-exporting countries either exempt from tax income from such investments or grant a credit to their taxpayers for taxes given up by the
developing countries. If the investor's home country grants a credit only
for taxes actually paid, as under current United States law, the reduction
of income tax burdens by developing countries may serve merely to increase
the revenue accruing to the investor's home country. The investor receives
no benefit from the concessions, unless he is willing to retain the profits in
a foreign corporation and thereby defer taxation by his own country.
Despite strenuous arguments often made to the effect that tax incentives
are an inefficient and excessively expensive means of attracting foreign investment, the report reveals that such concessions are still considered indis• United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Tax Treaties between
Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doe. E/4614/ST/ECA/110 (1969).
Economic and Social Council Res. 1273 (XLIII), Economic and Social Council, 43d
Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 1 (E/4429), p. 5.
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pensable by a number of developing countries. The members from the
developing countries appeared unanimous in urging capital-exporting nations to frame their legislation so as to preserve the incentive effects of
tax concessions granted by developing countries. Their position was supported by a number of experts from developed nations who agreed that
measures such as the tax-sparing credit and the exemption of direct investment income from developing countries are essential to place foreign investors in such countries in a competitive position with other investors who
can take full advantage of tax concessions. In opposition to this point of
view, one member from a developed country insisted that equal treatment
should be viewed from the perspective of the investor's home country,
and that exemption or tax sparing could result in a considerably lighter
tax burden for some of the country's investors than for others. He also
pointed out that a capital-exporting country might encourage investments
in developing nations through devices other than tax sparing or exemption
of investment income. No general consensus could be reached on the issue
of tax incentives, although the report indicates that most of the members
favored the adoption by the capital-exporting nations of tax measures to
encourage investment in developing countries.
Much of the attention of the group was devoted to a consideration of
rules allocating taxing authority between an investor's home country and
the foreign jurisdiction within which his income-producing activities are
carried on. The panel adopted as the basis for discussion a Draft Model
Convention prepared by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development.7 Several members contended that the OECD draft, having
been drawn up by experts from developed countries, could not even serve
as a basis for discussing solutions to the particular problems involved in
tax treaties between countries of greatly different levels of economic development. They contended that the primary right of the country in which
income has its source to tax such income must be recognized in treaties
between developed and developing countries and that the OECD draft
fails to adhere to this principle. Despite this objection, a majority of the
experts supported the proposal to base discussions on the OECD Model
Convention, but there was general agreement that modifications in the
draft are necessary for treaties between developed and developing nations.
The pane's discussions indicate a wide variety of views as to allocation
rules appropriate to the treatment of particular forms of income. With
regard to shipping profits, for example, several members from developed
countries strongly urged retention of the OECD provision assigning exclusive taxing rights to the country in which the management of the shipping company is located. One expert from a developing country expressed
himself in favor of this view, while several others asserted the importance
to their countries of the revenue available from foreign shipping lines.
One expert proposed that developed and developing countries agree to
share taxation of shipping profits on a fifty-fifty basis. There was also a
r Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Draft Double Taxation
Convention on Income and Capital (1963), OECD Doe. C (63) 87 (1967).
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variety of views expressed as to how profits attributable to operations of
an international shipping company within any one country could be calculated. No general conclusions were reached.
Despite the multiplicity of views expressed, general agreement was
reached on several points. A draft provision on taxing income from professional services and similar independent activities, submitted by a member
from Israel and modified by a participant from India, was approved by
the group in lieu of the corresponding provision of the OECD Model
Convention. A limited number of provisions of the OECD draft were
accepted by the group without controversy. On several points the experts
agreed to general principles without elaborating precise guidelines. With
regard to the taxation of interest, for instance, general consent was given
to the principle that neither the source country nor the investor's home
country should have an exclusive right to tax such income, but no agreement was reached on a formula for sharing the tax base. Perhaps as useful
as the agreements reached was the elaboration of a range of possible
solutions to problems considered by the panel. With respect to taxation
of income arising from building, construction or assembly projects, for
example, guidelines were proposed for determining under what circumstances the country in which such projects are carried out can tax the
profits resulting to non-residents.
The great diversity of views on the allocation of taxing power is explicable in part by the particular trade and investment relations maintained by
the various nations which sent participants to the ad hoc group. A developing country with no facilities for international shipping could not be
expected to be as concerned about the right of countries with such facilities
to tax shipping profits as about other provisions of tax treaties more relevant to its economic situation. A developed nation with substantial trade
relations with developing nations but few direct investments might feel
no hesitation in offering tax concessions for direct investment income received by its residents, as such concessions would mean little in terms of
revenue. The multiplicity of viewpoints expressed by the experts is therefore not to be taken as evidence that the conclusion of treaties between
developed and developing countries faces insuperable obstacles. It is only
reasonable that such treaties should be tailored to the particular pattern
of economic relationships existing between the two contracting parties.
The provisions of each treaty may be expected to reflect a balance of concessions by each side, determined by the particular transactions, whether
they be trade, shipping, sharing of technology or direct investment, which
dominate economic relations between the two countries. For the purpose
of facilitating negotiation of such treaties, conferences such as that organized by the United Nations can play an important r6le in clarifying the
relevant issues and in presenting possible solutions to problems. Consideration should also be given to the suggestion of an Israeli member of
the ad hoc group that an international panel of tax experts be established
from whom countries could seek technical advice on the negotiation of
tax treaties.
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The importance of a flexible approach to negotiating provisions of tax
treaties between developed and developing countries is suggested by a
survey of existing tax treaties prepared by the United Nations Secretariat
and submitted to the ad hoc panel of experts.8 The report analyzes the
extent to which existing treaties either conform to or deviate from the rules
contained in the OECD Model Convention. The study focuses not only
on agreements between developed and developing nations, but also on
the provisions of treaties concluded between developed nations. The survey reveals that there is considerable diversity in the provisions found in
both types of treaties and that departures from the Model Convention are
common for both. Some provisions, such as those relating to consultation
procedures and exchanges of information between contracting states, have
been adopted in nearly all recent treaties between developed and developing countries. The study comments that provisions for exchange of fiscal
information may represent the most important advantage of a tax treaty
for a developing country, as such provisions put at the disposal of the
revenue authority of the developing nation data gathered by the relatively
more extensive information-collecting facilities of the developed nation. A
developing nation may obtain information concerning income and expenses
of enterprises operating within its jurisdiction but controlled from the developed country. It may also obtain information relating to its own residents' financial activities in the developed country. The advantages gained
from such information-sharing will compensate to some extent, concludes
the report, for the revenue sacrificed by developing countries as a result
of limitations imposed by other provisions of tax treaties on their right
to tax income received by non-residents.
Despite considerable uniformity of provisions on consultation procedures,
information exchange and a few other topics, in general the agreements
concluded between developed and developing nations show significant variations from one another and from the OECD draft. The departures from
the OECD provisions are often in the direction of increasing the jurisdiction of the source country to tax income earned by non-residents. With
regard to interest income paid to non-residents, for instance, Article 11 of
the OECD draft restricts the source country to a withholding tax not in
excess of 10 percent, unless the debt from which the interest arises is effectively connected with a permanent establishment located in the source
country. Out of nearly 50 treaties reviewed in the report, only a handful
were as restrictive as the OECD provision on the source countly's taxing
authority. In a number of treaties the developing country retains full right
to tax interest income at its usual withholding rates. In a large number
of other agreements the source country agrees to limit its withholding tax
rate, but at rates higher than the 10 percent limit of the OECD provision.
Full tdxation of interest by the recipient's home country combined with full
exemption by the country of source, a common provision in agreements
8 The study, prepared by the Secretariat with the assistance of consultants from outside the United Nations, is printed as part of the U.N. Doe. E/4614/ST/ECA/11O,
p. 33 et seq.
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betveen developed countries, is found in only a few treaties between developed and developing nations.
With regard to measures adopted by capital-exporting countries to give
incentives for investment in developing countries, the Secretariats report
views with equal favor the exemption by developed countries of income
from developing countries and the adoption of a tax-sparing credit provision in conjunction with a credit for foreign taxes paid. The report
points out that, if a developed country adopts a general exclusion of all
foreign-source income, the result may be to encourage investments in developed rather than developing nations. The study suggests instead that
selective exemption of foreign income by means of treaties between developed and developing nations can be relied upon to channel the desired
capital into the developing countries.
The observations contained in the Secretariat's report may be of particular relevance to United States policy in the light of recent suggestions
of fundamental changes in U. S. taxation of foreign-source income. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Edwin S. Cohen revealed, in a speech of
November 19, 1969, that the Treasury Department is weighing the ad,isability of either eliminating deferral of taxes on undistributed profits
earned by foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations or, alternatively,
exempting from U. S. taxation income received from direct investments
in foreign countries.9 The first alternative, subjecting all income of foreign
subsidiaries to U. S. taxes in the year earned, would eliminate the incentive which tax concessions given by developing countries still offer to U. S.
investors, who are currently able in many cases to postpone U. S. taxes by
reinvesting abroad profits earned by foreign corporations. The Assistant
Secretary's language indicated, however, that far more serious consideration is being given to the second alternative, exemption of direct investment
income regardless of whether or not it is distributed to U. S. shareholders.
This policy could also have important repercussions on investment in developing countries. In one sense, U. S. exemption could make tax concessions offered by developing countries more attractive to U. S. investors,
as the low rates would not be eliminated by U. S. taxes on profits distributed
to investors. Some have argued, on the other hand, that complete exemption would have adverse consequences to total investment in developing
countries, as it would remove an incentive to retention of profits by foreign
subsidiaries. Exemption might even, as suggested by the U.N. Secretariat's
report, stimulate investment in developed rather than developing countries. The report points out that, once tax concessions expire, tax rates
in developing countries are often quite high. Exemption might, therefore,
act primarily as an incentive to investment in developed countries with
rates lower than rates existing in the United States or numerous developing
countries.
Although the impact of unqualified exemption of foreign direct investment income on the flow of U. S. capital to developing countries is not easy
to predict, the consequences would be less open to doubt if a modification,
VTreasury Release K-277.
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outlined by Mr. Cohen as a possible exception to the exemption privilege,
were adopted. The Assistant Secretary suggested that exemption might be
denied to income earned in a country whose rates do not reach a minimum
standard to be established by U. S. law. Exemption might be denied, for
instance, to income earned in countries with rates beneath 35, 40 or 45
percent. On the assumption that tax concessions currently offered by a
number of developing countries result in effective tax rates beneath these
minimum levels, the result would be that income earned by U. S. taxpayers
from investments in such countries would be subject to full U. S. taxation
(with a credit given for foreign taxes as now), while investment in other
countries, including developed countries, would enjoy the full benefit of
rates lower than U. S. levels but still above the stipulated minimum. Such
a policy could seriously affect the tax incentive program currently offered
by a number of developing countries. It seems likely that such a change
in United States taxation of foreign investment income would create an incentive to shift the flow of overseas investments toward other developed
countries and away from investment in less developed nations. Regardless
of whether or not Assistant Secretary Cohen's envisioned changes are actually adopted, his statement casts doubt on the willingness of the United
States Government to take account of the special needs of the developing
nations in formulating new policies toward taxation of income from overseas investments.
The remarks of Mr. Cohen were, of course, directed toward possible
changes in United States legislation rather than tax treaties. In the treaty
field, however, there has been no new initiative by the Treasury to break
the existing stalemate with regard to treaties with developing countries.
Such an initiative is greatly needed. In formulating new policies to meet
the particular requirements of the developing nations, the United States
Government should consider carefully which of the alternative methods
of facilitating investments in developing countries will have the most
favorable long-term impact. Although tax-sparing and other methods which
the United States might adopt to preserve the full impact of tax relief
granted by capital-importing nations are often eagerly sought after by such
countries, there are good reasons to conclude that such provisions are
not the most appropriate means to stimulate the desired investment. The
chief reason is that such provisions adopted by the investor's home country
place maximum pressure on the developing nations to foresake sorely
needed tax revenues by granting tax holidays and other concessions. For
the purpose of stimulating investment in developing countries without undermining their fiscal resources, some sort of tax incentive by the capitalexporting nation tied to the act of investing itself would seem more desirable. Such a measure would not increase pressure on developing nations
to reduce tax rates and would relate the incentive directly to the action
which it is intended to encourage: capital investment rather than repatriation of profits.
One objective in the drafting of any treaty provision granting tax relief
tied to capital investment should be to restrict the tax benefits as much as
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possible to that increment of total investment which would not have been
made in the absence of the incentive provision. The tendency to grant tax
concessions for investments which would have been made even without
special incentives is a familiar one and often makes tax incentives extremely expensive in comparison to the added benefits which they produce. 10
A related objective should be to formulate incentive provisions which
apply only to the specific types of investments which it is desired to encourage. It might be desirable to restrict tax concessions to investments
in certain industries or regions of the country, depending upon the development plans of the particular capital-importing country with which a treaty
is being concluded. Care must also be taken to avoid provisions which
stimulate transactions detrimental to the economic growth of the developing nations."1
Clearly a new initiative by the United States is required to break the
current stalemate in efforts to reach accord with developing countries on
treaties to promote trade and development through harmonizing tax laws.
Such treaties are important not only in preventing double taxation and
promoting co-operation between tax administrators of the contracting nations. The), also serve to create a climate of confidence among investors,
who can feel assurance that the basic rules determining their tax liabilities
have been agreed upon and that channels of consultation exist in case of
disputes. It has been suggested that this climate of confidence may be
as important as any specific provisions of tax treaties in promoting investments in developing countries.12 It is to be hoped that the recent exchanges of views stimulated by the United Nations will pave the way for
a successful effort by the United States to reach agreements with developing
countries in this inportant field.
PATCK L. KELLEY *

NEUTRALizATION OF ISRAEL

In the April, 1970, issue of Foreign Affairs I Dr. Nahum Goldmann,
President of the World Jewish Congress, advances the novel proposal that,
as a solution to the crisis in the Middle East, Israel be made a permanently
neutralized state along the lines of Switzerland. In Dr. Goldmann's view
- See Stanley S. Surrey, 'Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government

Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures," 83 Harvard Law Rexew 705 (1970).
1The West German Development Aid Tax Law, for example, grants concessions to

Cc ,man exporters of finished and semi-finished goods to developing countries, even
Thogh the effect may be to impair the competitive ability of producers of such goods

located within the developing countries. Dietrich von Boetticher, "A New Approach
to Ta xation of Investments in Less Developed Countries," 17 A. J. Comp. Law 529,
557 (1969).

"- See Martin Norr, "Less Developed Country Treaties," in Practising Law Institute,
U. S. Taxation of Foreign Operations 161, 164 (1968).
* Teaching Fellow and Research Associate, International Tax Program, Harvard Law
School.
I "The Future of Israel," 48 Foreign Affairs 443 (1970).
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the success of this solution would depend on the two preconditions of a
cease-fire between Israel and the Arab states and settlement of the Arab
refugee problem. He argues that neutralization of Israel would appeal
to the Arab states because it would quiet their fears of Israeli territorial
expansion and eliminate a major obstacle to a united Arab policy. Both
the United States and the Soviet Union would support such a proposal,
Dr. Goldmann believes, because neither state desires a wider war and both
wish to avoid a confrontation over the Arab-Israeli conflict. From the
Israeli perspective, Dr. Goldmann contends, neutralization with effective
international guarantees would enhance its security and allow Israel to
divert some of its resources now applied to military requirements to economic, cultural and spiritual efforts. Dr. Goldmann believes that an "effective" guarantee of the neutrality of Israel might require stationing of a
permanent symbolic international force in Israel, as well as retention of
Israeli armed forces, but that, if the guarantee were coupled with a control
of arms deliveries to the Middle East, Israel would gradually be able to
shift its resources from the military to civilian areas of its society.
Dr. Goldmann himself admits that his proposal "may appear to hardboiled politicians today as a quixotic vision." Indeed, the feasibility of
neutralization of Israel would depend upon resolution of a number of difficult political and psychological problems, a discussion of which is beyond
the scope of this note.2 Nonetheless, it may be useful at this time to
consider some of the legal issues which neutralization of Israel would involve: What would be the purpose of such a neutralization? How might
it be accomplished and what would be the rights and duties of Israel and
other states? In what ways, if at all, are the experiences of Switzerland,
Belgium and Luxembourg, Austria, and Laos, all instances of permanent
neutralization, relevant to these problems?
The primary objective of neutralization in international law has been to
promote the avoidance or management of conflict. 3 To this end parties to
neutralization arrangements have sought the creation of "buffer states" to
stabilize balance-of-power rivalries and/or the removal of a state as a
focal point of international conflict. The neutralizations of Switzerland,
Belgium and Luxembourg are examples of attempts to fulfill the first objective, and those of Austria and Laos the second. These objectives are
not mutually exclusive, however. One of the purposes of neutralization of
Switzerland was to protect it from the expansionist designs of various
European Powers, especially France.
Since Israel is not in any sense a "buffer state," the purpose of its neutralization would be to remove the territory of Israel as a focal point of
international conflict. But the preliminary and fundamental problem is:
What territory makes up the state of Israel? Sharm el Sheikh? The Golan
Heights? The Gaza Strip? Jerusalem? As a first step, it would be neces2 For an excellent and exhaustive study of the political, as well as many of the
legal problems of neutralization, see Black, Falk, Knorr and Young, Neutralization and
World Politics (1968).
3 See, generally, Black, op. cit. note 2 above; 1 Whiteman, Digest of International,
Law 342-364 (1963); Kunz, "Austria's Permanent Neutrality," 50 A.J.I.L. 418 (1956).
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sary to resolve this issue before proceeding to the neutralization of the territory of Israel.
Neutralization, as distinguished from a policy of neutrality, can be
brought about only by treaty and not by unilateral declaration. 4 Under
present international law and practice the procedure would be to conclude
a treaty of neutralization between Israel and other interested states or entities, with Israel's consent. It is no longer supportable for the great Powers
by treaty among themselves to impose the status of neutralization upon
weaker states, as the European Powers did in the nineteenth century with
regard to Belgium and Luxembourg.
The parties to a treat , neutralizing Israel would at a minimum have to
include Israel, the Arab states, the United States, and the Soviet Union,
i.e., the prinary protagonists in the Middle East crisis. In addition, it
would seem desirable and perhaps indispensable to include the United
Kingdom. France and the United Nations as parties, because of the r6le
they might play in maintaining and guaranteeing the neutralization of Israel.
Wbat could be expected to be the duties of Israel as a neutralized state?
Tle neutralized state, in the historic model, is required to abstain from
going to Nar except in self-defense and to avoid policies and actions that
ijight involve it in hostilities, such as adherence to a treaty entailing a
political comnmitment, especially a defensive alliance, a treaty of guarantee,
or a collective security arrangement. If a war or armed conflict breaks
ot between other states, the neutralized state may be required to remain
nculral in the strict, classic sense. Its duties include refraining from joinhrg , intcrnational military action, whether it be under the aegis of the
United Nations or any other international organization, and from allowing
passage of troops of a belligerent through, or the flying of a belligerent's
planes over, its territory. At the same time neutralization does not necessarily mean demilitarization. On the contrary, the neutralized state not
only has a right but an obligation to defend its neutrality,, if need be by
armed force. The success of Swiss neutrality is due in large part to the
strength of the military establishment of that country.
Fulfillment of these obligations would not be an onerous burden for
Israel. Israel is not presently a member of any alliance that, at least arguA distinction is usually drawn between "neutralization" and "neutrality." Neutrality
is defined as a voluntary policy that a state may adopt in time of war with respect to
bclligcur-nts. Neutralization, on the other hand, refers to a permanent status, acquired
by agreement with other states, which cannot be relinquished without their consent.
"Pcnnanent neutrality" is often used in the same sense as neutralization. See 1 White,man, op. cit. note 3 above, at 342-343.

Arguably, Austria should be classified as an example of neutrality instead of neutrlization because the State Treaty with Austria contains no reference to Austria's
neutralization. Rather, the terms of Austria's neutralization are found in a Constitutional Federal Statute enacted by the Austrian Parliament. It has been contended,
howeller, that the Austrian statute is more than a unilateral declaration of policy because
(a) it w as enacted pursuant to an international obligation, the so-called Moscow Memorandum of April 15, 1955, between Austria and the Soviet Union, and (b) the neutralization of Austria has been generally recognized by states members of the international community. See Kunz, loc. cit. note 3 above, at 419-422.
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ably, might jeopardize its independence of political action, nor has it permitted the establishment of foreign military bases. And it has shown itself
highly capable of defending the inviolability of its territory.
On the other hand there could be substantial disagreement as to whether
Israel would be precluded from joining customs or economic unions or
required to maintain any kind of ideological neutrality. Both Switzerland
and Austria have applied for association with the European Economic
Community, but the Soviet Union has strongly objected to Austria's application as a violation of its neutrality5 There might also be a question
whether continued Israeli membership in the United Nations would be
compatible with its status as a neutralized state., All of these questions
would have to be resolved in the treaty of neutralization.
As for the other parties to the treaty, should they be required simply to
recognize the neutralization of Israel or to guarantee it as well? 7 A state
recognizing the neutrality of another country is normally obliged to refrain from taking any action that might violate that neutrality. Thus the
recognizing state is required to respect the independence and territorial
integrity of the neutralized state. It must not directly or indirectly interfere in the internal affairs of the neutralized state or use the territory of
the neutralized state for interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It must not introduce troops or establish military bases in the territory of the neutralized state, nor attempt in any way to induce the neutralized state to enter into military alliances. Above all, it must not resort to the
use of force or threat of force, or take any other measure which might impair the peace of the neutralized state. 8
Israel, however, would be strongly concerned with the defense of its
neutrality, and recognition of permanent neutrality does not oblige the
recognizing state to defend the neutralized state's neutrality. Only a
guarantee of the neutralization of a state gives rise to an obligation to defend it. Such a guarantee can be given by states severally or collectively.,
If it is collective, the guarantors must act as a body; but if the guarantee
is given by states severally, each state is under a duty to act which is
GIn 1961 the Soviet Union repeatedly warned the Austrian Government that its
application for association with the European Economic Community would be regarded
as a violation of Austrian neutrality and the prohibition of the Austrian State Treaty
against political or economic union with Germany. The Austrian Government rejected these protests on Oct. 2, 1961, in a note to the Soviet Union. 1 Whiteman,
op. cit. note 3 above, at 352-353.
0 Switzerland has consistently refused to become a Member of the United Nations
on the ground the collective security system, operating through the Security Council,
might require it to take positions incompatible with its permanent neutrality in the
event of armed conflicts. On the other hand, for a view that there are no legally valid
objections to the membership of a neutralized state in the United Nations, see Verdross,
"Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization," 50 AJ.I.L.
61 (1956).
7 See 1 Vhiteman, op. cit. note 3 above, at 350.
8 For a draft model treaty of neutralization, see Black, Falk, Knorr and Young, op. cit.
note 2 above, at 191-195.
9 1 Oppenheim, International Law 966-967 (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955).
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peculiar to it. In light of the unhappy historical experience with unanirolity voting requirements, it is likely that Israel would insist that the
guarantee be several or collective and several. Also, Israel would require
substantial assurances that its security would be enhanced rather than endalngered by uutralization before it would consider, as part of the bargain,
giving up such strategically important areas as the Gaza Strip, Sharm el
Sbeikh. the Golan Heights, and the West Bank of the Jordan.
Until the three-member Commission for Supervision and Control of
Laos, cstablisl-ed under the Geneva Agreement of 1954, was assigned the
task of enforcing the neutralization of Laos, there was no provision in international law or practice for the establishment of control machinery to ensure
the maintenance of a treaty. of neutralization. The Commission, however,
has proven ineffectve in controlling repeated interventions by several
guarantor states, largely for such reasons as lack of access to parts of the
country controlled by Communist forces, dissension among the members
of the Commission, and the unanimity requirement for decisions whether
a violation of the agreements has occurred. Moreover, as an instrument
of th guarantor states, the Commission has not been able to play an independent r6le in determining whether these states are fulfilling their ob-

ligations."
ould surely demand a more impartial commission with more
Israel ws
effective po\w ers. To ensure impartiality, such a commission might be
'.tablished under United Nations auspices with members selected from
states not parties to the treat, of neutralization. The commission would
have the responsibility of investigating cases in which, in the opinion of a
iuajority of the members of the commission, there are reasonable grounds
for assuming that a violation of the treaty has occurred. Israel and the
other parties to the treaty would be under an obligation to provide the
commission with the resources and authority necessary to carry out its
duties, In particular, the commission would have to be granted free access
to all parts of the territory of Israel, as well as adequate transportation and
Qoi mu nication facilities.
The United Nations experience with peacekeeping operations and the
experience in Laos indicate that the parties would be unlikely to agree
that the commission itself should have power to decide whether a violation
of the treaty has occurred. Rather, the functions of the commission would
probably be limited to observation, fact-finding, and the submission of
reports to a plcnua,, meeting of the parties or to the United Nations for
further action. At any rate, some provision should be made for decisions
as to hether a violation of the treat, has occurred, and this decision should
be made by a majority, or perhaps a two-thirds vote not subject to veto.
Any treaty of neutralization for Israel should provide for periodic re,icw of its provisions, and meetings to consider revisions in the treaty should
be called within a certain period -after the receipt of a request for such
a meeting from any party to the treaty. However, no modification or
Confliet in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization 247-250 (1964),
-,Scc
Dumm,
for a di,emuion of the failure of the Commission to control the conflict.
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abolition of the status of neutralization could be made in the absence of the
consent of all parties to the treaty, including Israel.
As indicated at the outset, the political and psychological problems that
neutralization of Israel would face are outside the scope of this note.
It may be stated parenthetically, however, that the political climate for
neutralization is not favorable at this time. The success of neutralization
depends in large part upon a convergence of interests in resolving or avoiding conflict between the guarantor states and between the guarantor states
and the neutralized state. No such convergence of interests presently exists
in the Middle East. On the contrary the polarization between the parties
to the conflict has never been greater. Unless and until there is a substantial change in the attitudes of the parties, therefore, the chances for a
successful neutralization of Israel would seem slim.
JOHN F. Mupnpiy
REcxoINAL CONFMENCE: OF T=E SocMrT,

EmcrS

CHiCAcO:

Tim LEGAL

OF "WARS OF LiBERATION"

The contemporary significance of "wars of liberation" and their manifestation in Southeast Asia and the Middle East demonstrates the need to
explore their legal significance and effects. This was the subject of a regional meeting of the Society in Chicago, April 6, 1970, co-sponsored by
DePaul University College of Law.
To lay the definitional and philosophical foundation of the question,
Professor Edward M. Wise of Wayne State opened the conference with his
views on "Vhat Is a War of Liberation?" The classification of conflicts as
"wars of liberation" depends on the legal consequences of designating a
situation as constituting a "war." A great variety of conflicts may be considered as "wars of liberation." The paradigm case was armed hostilities
even though between a metropolitan Power and an ethnically distinct
people seeking to cast off colonial rule. Soviet doctrine treats a "war of
liberation" in every sense as an international war. One corollary of the
Soviet view is that "wars of liberation" are subject to all the rules that govern armed conflicts between two states; but this consequence must be discounted, because laws of war assume conditions of mutuality that do not
hold, by and large, for "wars of liberation." The crux of the Soviet doctrine
lies rather in the assertions that "wars of liberation" constitute a permissible
use of armed force; and that third parties are therefore at liberty to intervene on behalf of the colonial people. The second assertion, however, does
not necessarily follow from the first; there is considerable danger in allowing
individual governments to act on their own in deciding which of two contestants is in the right. The first assertion assumes that international law
recognizes a right of self-determination and that this right ranks in importance with the Charter's limitation on the use of force except in selfdefense. Wise was skeptical about the validity of either of these two as* Associate Professor of Law, Kansas University.
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sumptions. There is danger in allowing governments to characterize the
conflict and to decide whether to intervene unilaterally.
Professor John N. Moore of Virginia discussed "The Control of Foreign
Intervention in Internal Conflict" and adverted to the magnitude of the
threat to world order. He suggested three useful perspectives in responding to the issues raised by intervention problems: (1) an international legal
perspective: "When is intervention consistent with community common interest?"; (2) a political perspective: '"When is intervention which is consistent with community common interest also justified by the national interest?"; and (3) a strategic perspective: "'Vhen is intervention, which is
otherwise justifiable, likely to be successful?" In exploring the international
legal perspective, Professor Moore discussed the intellectual confusion about
intervention resulting from inadequate problem-solving tools and the limitations of the customary law of non-intervention. An alternative approach
would be to recognize explicitly the value element in questions of intervention and to achieve a balance of emphasis between institutional and
normative concerns. He recommended a detailed set of normative standards, a set of contextual guidelines for policy-makers, and several proposals
for institutional change, including a multilateral treaty for the international
reporting of military assistance, an international agency for observation
and disclosure, and a restructuring of the national foreign policy process
to include an international legal perspective in decision-making.
The luncheon speaker was Professor R. R. Baxter of Harvard, who discussed "Prisoners of War in Wars of Liberation." The afternoon session
was devoted to the two contemporary conflicts which have been asserted
to be "wars of liberation." Professor Samuel Bleicher of Toledo spoke on
"Vietnam and the Definition of Aggression." He examined the impact
of the Viet-Nam experience upon the traditional definitions of aggression,
which are based upon prohibition of the use of force across international
boundaries. North Viet-Nam is said to have violated this proscription but
has not been condemned as an aggressor by world public opinion, as was
the Soviet Union for invading Czechoslovakia. North Viet-Nam's posture
can be distinguished on the following bases: (1) the artificiality of the
international boundary between North and South Viet-Nam, (2) the relatively low level of force employed by North Viet-Nam, (3) the negative
attitude of the South Vietnamese r~gime toward human rights, (4) the
cultural estrangement of the South Vietnamese Government from the
masses, (5) the absence of an effective economic reform program in South
Viet-Nam, and (6) the autocratic nature of the South Vietnamese Government.

In situations in which these six factors are present, acts by an interested
party which could be defined as aggression will not be treated as such because they are, in fact, acceptable to much of the international community.
A new definition of aggression, therefore, should recognize this reality of
international behavior.
The concluding paper by Professor W. Thomas Malison, Jr., of George
Washington University, addressed itself to "The Palestinian War of Libera-
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tion." Reviewing the history of Zionism, its claims to the area and gradual
take-over, Mallison retraced the present conflict in the Middle East to
Zionist roots. Examining the early development of the question, he emphasized the incompatibility of European-born Zionism with Arabism (as
conflicting doctrines) and showed the gradual expansion of Zionist control
over Palestine. Asserting the legitimacy of the Palestinian people's claim
to their homeland, he concluded that the law of war is applicable between
Palestinians and Israelis. He asserted that Israel's non-compliance with
United Nations resolutions and international law had led to the present
state of affairs, and concluded that a peaceful solution can be attained by
compliance with United Nations resolutions.
M. OCmm BASSIOUNI *

REGIONAL MEEMNG OF T-M SocLETY IN IOWA

CrrY, IowA

Global pollution was the subject of an American Society of International
Law regional meeting on February 27-28, 1970, at Iowa City, Iowa. Cosponsors of this public symposium were the Stanley Foundation; the University of Iowa Student Senate, Graduate College, Center for International
Studies, and Action Studies Program; the Iowa Student Bar Association;
the Council on International Relations and United Nations Affairs, Iowa
City Chapter; the United Nations Association, Iowa City Chapter; BoiseCascade Corporation; Wheelabrator Corporation; and the League of Women
Voters, Iowa City Chapter.
David D. Dominick, Commissioner of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, Department of the Interior, was the keynote speaker
for the meeting. Mr. Dominick's talk, "Pollution, Rights, and the United
States," was delivered Friday evening, February 27. The morning and
afternoon sessions on Saturday, February 28, featured talks delivered by
Robert E. Stein, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, on "Pollution, Rights, and Military Activities," and by Abel Wolman, Professor
Emeritus of Sanitary Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University, on "Pollution, Rights, and Economic Development."
Presiding as chairman of the symposium was Albert E. Utton, Professor
of International Law, University of New Mexico, and editor of The Natural
Resources Journal. The speakers received questions and comments from
the audience and from panels consisting of: Richard B. Bilder, Professor of
Law, University of Wisconsin; George E. Brosseau, Professor of Zoology,
University of Iowa; and Marvin Kalkstein, Professor of Political Science and
Sociology, State University of New York, Stony Brook, for the Saturday
morning session; and Richard G. Bond, Professor and Director of Environmental Health, University! of Minnesota; John Morey Maurice, Attorney,
Boise-Cascade Corporation, Boise, Idaho; Edward Lee Rogers, General
* Professor of Law, DePaul University; 1970 Fulbright-Hays Professor of International
Criminal Law (Germany) and visiting Professor of Law, University of Freiburg.
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Counsel, Environmental Defense Fund, Stony Brook, New York; and Mr.
Stein, for the Saturday afternoon session.
Banquets were given Friday and Saturday evenings for symposium participants, members of the University of Iowa Faculty and Administration,
and students. Receptions were held both nights following sessions of the
symposium, with students and the general public invited and attending.
Attendance figures totaled more than 400, including persons from distant
Iowa towns and other States. The meeting was planned and presented by
the Iowa Society of International Law, a student organization at the University of Iowa College of Law.
EDWARD J. LEMONS

Symposium Coordinator,
Iowa Society of International
Law

PRIZES INSTITUTED BY JA ms BROWN Scou-r IN MEmoRY OF

His Moim AND His Sis=

JEANNETm

Scoir

The Institute of International Law announces the subject for the Henry
Wheaton Prize (2,000 Swiss francs) to be awarded in 1973. The subject
is the following: "The status of diminutive States in international institution'."
The competition is open to anyone except members or associates or
forner members or associates of the Institute.
The essays submitted should be unpublished manuscripts of not less than
150 nor more than 500 pages corresponding to a printed octavo page of
the same character as a page of the volume of the Annuaire de rInstitut
de Droit international. Essays may be Written in English, French, German, Italian or Spanish. They should be sent anonymously in three copies.
Each copy must be supplied with two mottoes. The same mottoes should
be inscribed on an accompanying envelope containing the surname and
first names, the date and the place of birth, the nationality and the address
of the author. The essays must be in the hands of the Acting Deputy Secretary General of the Institute (Professor Paul De Visseher, 82, avenue du
Castel, 1200 Brussels, Belgium) not later than December 31, 1972.
The conditions of the Prize will be found in the Annuaire de rlInstitut de
Droit internationalfor 1967, Vol. 52, pp. 695-699.
E. H. F.
JouRNAL OF MARITIm

LAw AND Co~r~nmcE

A new periodical of interest to lawyers, particularly those engaged in
the practice of maritime law and international law, has appeared within
the last year or so. It is the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, the
first English-language periodical on maritime law. The Editor is Professor David M. Sassoon of Georgetown University Law Center. The
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Associate Editor and Case Editor is John P. McMahon of the New York
Bar, and the Book Review Editor is Professor David Suratgar of Georgetown University Law Center. The other members of the editorial board
are Professors Albert H. Garretson, Nicholas J. Healy and Andreas F.
Lowenfeld of New York University Law School, Joseph C. Sweeney and
Ludwik A. Teclaff of Fordham University Law School, Allan I. Mendelsohn of the D. C. Bar, and Eileen M. Teclaff of Brooklyn, N. Y. The Advisory Board of Editors consists of distinguished jurists and professors in
this country and abroad.
The most recent issue, that for October, 1970, contains articles on arbitration clauses and choice of forum clauses in bills of lading and the Hague
Rules of 1924; the "container clause" in the 1968 Protocol to the Hague
Rules; general average in the container age; the American trade embargo
of China; proposed amendments to the U. S. Merchant Marine Act of
1936; the World Bank and port development; the Ecuador fisheries dispute; and the outer boundary of the Continental Shelf. There are a number of notes on recent cases in maritime law, as well as book reviews on
subjects in the field. A section of Texts and Documents contains the Declaration of Montevideo on the Law of the Sea.
The Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce is an innovation in the
English-speaking world and should attract many readers. It is published
quarterly by the Jefferson Law Book Company, 933 Gist Avenue, Silver
Spring, Md. 20910. The subscription price is $20 in the United States,
Canada and Mexico; $21.50 in Europe, Central and South America; and
$22.50 in Asia, Africa and Australia. Subscriptions should be sent to the
publication office of the Journal at the above address. Manuscripts and
correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, at 4632 Reservoir Road,
N. W., Washington, D. C. 20007.
ELEANoR H. FNCH
65ma ANNuAL MEnNc OF THE SocmnTr
The Society will hold its 65th annual meeting from April 29 to May 1,
1971, at the Stafler-Hilton Hotel in Washington, D. C. The meeting will
open on Thursday morning, April 29, and close on Saturday afternoon, May
1, 1971. The dinner will be held on Friday evening, April 30. Following
the business session on Saturday morning, at 9:30 a.m., for election of
officers and transaction of other business, there will be a luncheon with
the Section on International and Comparative Law of the American Bar
Association at 12:00 o'clock noon. Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Chairman of the
A.B.A. Section, will preside. The speaker at the luncheon will be Constantin A. Stavropoulos, Under Secretary General and Legal Counsel of the
United Nations.
The first session on Thursday morning, April 29, at 10:30 a.m., will be
devoted to a panel discussion of Chinese participation in the United Nations. On Thursday afternoon, at 2:15 p.m., the session will consist of two
panels and a round-table discussion. One panel will deal with self-deter-
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mination and settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the other, with new
developments in the law of international aviation: the control of aerial hijacking. The latter discussion is jointly sponsored with the Canadian Branch
of the International Law Association and the Canadian Society of International Lawv. The round-table discussion is entitled: "The Social Scientist
Looks at the International Law of Conflict Management."
On Thursday evening, at 8:15 p.m., there wll be panels on the future
of South West Africa (Namibia) and on conflicting approaches to the
control and exploitation of the oceans. The oceans panel is jointly sponsored with the American Branch of the International Law Association. At
the Thursday evening session there will also be a round-table discussion
of the r6le of Congress in the making of foreign policy.
On Friday morning, April 30, at 9:15 a.m., two panels will consider, respectively, procedures for protection of civilians and prisoners of war in
armed conflicts, Southeast Asian examples, and conflicting assumptions about
international trade: neo-protectionism or reasonable accommodation of national interests? A round table on the dilemma of foreign investment in
South Africa will be jointly sponsored with the Association of Student International Law Societies.
On Friday afternoon, at 2:15 p.m., there wvill be a panel discussion of
the future of the International Court of Justice, a discussion group on the
teaching of international aspects of human rights, and a round table on
new proposals for increasing the r6le of international law in government
decision-making.
On Saturday afternoon, at 2:30 p.m., the Philip C. Jessup International
Law Moot Court Competition finals will be held. There will also be a
round-table discussion, jointly sponsored with the German Society for International Law, of the Barcelona Traction and Aris Gloves cases, under the
rubric, "Toward More Adequate Diplomatic Protection of Private Claims."
Professor John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia School of
Law, Charlottesville, Virginia, is Chairman of the Committee on the Annual Meeting, which is arranging the program. The program outlined is
tentative, and further details -ill be supplied in the Society's Newsletter
for February. Registration and reservation cards for the meeting will go
out to the members shortly. They are urged to make hotel room reservations as soon as possible. As in previous years, a block of rooms will be
held at the Statler-Hilton for members attending the meeting.
ELEAN oR H. FNcH

